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Abstract. We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM,
defined through ST and TS, two well known substructural consequence relations for inferences.
While ST recovers every classically valid inference, it invalidates some classically valid metain-
ferences. While CM works as ST at the inferential level, it also recovers every classically valid
metainference. Moreover, CM can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Neverthe-
less, CM cannot recapture every classically valid meta-metainference. We will afterwards develop a
hierarchy of consequence relations CMn for metainferences of level n (for 1 ≤ n < ω). Each CMn
recovers every metainference of level n or less, and can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent
truth predicate, but cannot recapture every classically valid metainferences of higher levels. Finally,
we will present a logic CMω , based on the hierarchy of logics CMn, that is fully classical, in the
sense that every classically valid metainference of any level is valid in it. Moreover, CMω can be
nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate.
§1. Introduction. Nonclassical theories of truth pursue two conflicting desiderata. On
the one hand, they search for a paradox-free transparent truth predicate. On the other
hand, they want to retain as much classical logic as possible. This conflict is recently
examined in [19]. There, Hjortland claimed that “nonclassical theories try to recapture
classical principles in special cases. This is a form of damage control”. Hjortland calls this
desideratum “the maxim of minimal mutilation.”
Within the family of substructural solutions to semantic paradoxes, the one that seems
to have the best credentials regarding the “damage-control policy”, is ST+. ST+ is a truth-
theory that has the nontransitive theory ST as its base logic.1 What is special about it is that
its supporters have a strong case for the claim that ST is just classical logic in disguise. The
main reason for this assertion is that an inference is valid in classical logic if and only if it
is valid in ST. A logic is defined in terms of its valid (and invalid) inferences. Therefore, it
is not possible to discriminate between classical logic and ST.
Nevertheless, ST and classical logic seem to behave very different in other, and very
relevant at that, respects. In particular, ST does not validate some key classically valid
metainferences. A metainference can be roughly characterized as an inference that has a
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1 A logic is usually understood as an order pair of a language and a consequence relation. A
consequence relation is, informally, a standard that an inference may, or may not, live up to
(or, extensionally, a set or collection of inferences). Nevertheless, in what follows we will freely
use both terms as synonyms.
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set of inferences as premises, and a particular inference as the conclusion. An important
metainference that ST gives up is Cut. But is not the only one. Metainferential forms of
Modus Ponens and Explosion are also invalid in ST. Thus, ST is not optimal in keeping
as much classical logic as possible. Moreover, a theory of truth based on a nonclassical
logic that recovers not only every classically valid inference, but also every classically
valid metainference, seems to better achieve this goal. In the following sections, we will
present both a logic and a truth theory with those features. We will called them TS/ST+ and
TS/ST, respectively. One special feature of TS/ST is that two well known substructural
consequence relations—namely, ST and TS—are used to characterize them in a pretty
straightforward way.
This paper is structured as follows. In §2 we introduce in a more precise way the distinc-
tion between inferences and metainferences, along with a suitable notion of metainferential
validity. We will also distinguish between different—finite—levels that a metainference
can take. These ideas are essential to understand exactly what TS/ST accomplishes. We
will also present two substructural logics, ST and TS, that will be used to define TS/ST.
In §3 we present TS/ST, a metainferential consequence relation that not only validates
every classically valid inference, as ST, but also every classically valid metainference (of
level 1). Moreover, we will show how TS/ST—or, as we will also call it, CM—can be
expanded with a transparent truth predicate. That new truth theory will be called TS/ST+.
In §4 we introduced CM2, a consequence relation for metainferences of level 2. CM2
recovers not only the same things as TS/ST, but also recaptures every classically valid
meta-metainference. This result is pushed one step forward in §5. In this section, we define
a hierarchy of logics CMn. Every CMn validates every classically valid metainference
of level n or less, and can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. In §6 we
introduce the logic CMω . CMω is the union of the theories in the hierarchy of logics CMn.
Every classically valid metainference of any level is valid in CMω . Moreover, it can also
be expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Finally, in §8 we offer some concluding
remarks, and point out some possible future developments of this project.
§2. Metainferences, metainferential validity and two substructural logics. In the
next section, we will introduce the target consequence relation for metainferences, TS/ST
(that will later be called CM, to emphasize the relation that it has with the other logics
that we will introduce). TS/ST will validate every classically valid sentence, inference and
metainference of level 1. But it is not a standard consequence relation: it does not relate
sets of formulas of a language L, but sets of inferences (understood as pairs of sets of
formulas of L). But before moving on, it will be necessary to make some clarifications.
In particular, we will need to make precise the distinction between standard inferences
(as relations between sets of sentences) and metainferences. Moreover, we will need to
clarify what we mean by metainferential validity. Finally, we will introduce in some detail
two crucial substructural logics: ST and TS. They will play a key part in specifying how
TS/ST works.
2.1. Inferences and metainferences. To understand and carry out our investigation, it
will be essential to have an accurate grasp of the received view about inferences, metain-
ferences and consequence relations.
To analyze these matters, it will be useful to fix some terminology. Let L be a proposi-
tional language, such that FOR(L) is the absolutely free algebra of formulae of L, whose
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universe we denote by FOR(L). As usual, we will let ,, and other Greek capital letters
represent finite sets of formulae, while γ , δ, and other Greek minuscules represent formulae
such that γ ∈ , δ ∈ . Finally, A, B, C and D represent formulae that does not belong to
sets of formulae represented by Greek capital letters.
DEFINITION 2.1. A Tarskian consequence relation over a propositional language L is a
relation  ⊆ P(FOR(L))× FOR(L) obeying the following conditions for all A ∈ FOR(L)
and for all , ⊆ FOR(L):
(1)   A if A ∈  (Reflexivity)
(2) If   A and  ⊆ ′, then ′  A (Monotonicity)
(3) If   A and   B for every B ∈ , then   A (Cut).
Additionally, a (Tarskian) consequence relation  is substitution-invariant whenever if  
, and σ is a substitution on FOR(L), then {σ(A) | A ∈ }  {σ(B) | B ∈ }.
DEFINITION 2.2. A Tarskian logic over a propositional language L is an ordered pair
(FOR(L),), where  is a substitution-invariant Tarskian consequence relation.
Notwithstanding, many philosophers have argued against the Tarskian conception of
logic. For example, Shoesmith and Smiley [31], Avron [2], and Scott [30] argue for the
generalization of the Tarskian account multiple consequences. Avron [2] and Gabbay [17]
give reasons for relaxing the Monotonicity condition. Moreover, Malinowski [23] and
Frankowski [14] argued for a generalization or liberalization that allows logics to drop
Reflexivity, Cut, or both of them. It is this context where logics like the nonreflexive TS of
the nontransitive ST where introduced.
These modifications, in turn, bring on the possibility of a shift in the nature of the
collection of formulae featured in the consequence relation. Thus, instead of treating log-
ical consequence to hold between (sets of) formulae, it may hold between labeled for-
mulae, multisets of formulae (where repetition matters), sequences of formulae (where
order makes a difference), with multi-conclusions instead of single-conclusions, etc. Our
target logic, TS/ST, explicitly moves from understanding logical consequence as a relation
between collections of formulae, to conceiving it as a relation between collections of
inferences. Here, we should understand inferences as an ordered pair whose first member
is a set (or multiset, or sequence, etc.) of formulae, and a set of formulae as its second
term. A metainference, then, is an ordered pair whose first member is a set (or multiset,
etc.) of inferences, and a single inference as its second term. This is a relatively standard
move in the literature. Avron, in [1], first, and Blok and Jónsson in [6], second, discuss a
generalization of the Tarksian account that allows moving to logical consequence relations
that do not hold only between collections of formulae, but between objects of other nature.2
Thus, more precisely:
DEFINITION 2.3. An inference on L is an ordered pair (,), where , ⊆ FOR(L)
(written   ). SEQ0(L) is the set of all inferences or sequents on L.
2 Moreover, Avron suggested in [1] that the idea that logical consequence can be said to hold of
relata other than formulae is very reasonable to those used to sequent calculus systems—and,
most prominently, with substructural sequent calculi.
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DEFINITION 2.4 ([11]). A metainference on L is an ordered pair (,A), where  ⊆
SEQ0(L) and A ∈ SEQ0(L) (written  1 A). SEQ1(L) is the set of all metainferences
on L.3
We will say, accordingly, that the following one on the left is an inference, whereas the
one on the right is a metainference
  A
  B   C
  A .
Therefore, we will distinguish two different kinds of consequence relations: the infer-
ential and the metainferential. TS/ST—our target logic—is a consequence relation of this
last type. In the next subsection we will give a precise characterization of this notion.
2.2. Metainferential validity. A metainference, thus, is a pair (, δ), where  is a set
of inferences and δ is a particular inference. Every metainference will have the following
structure:
1  1, . . . , n  n
  	
We will call every i  i, a premise of the metainference, while   	 will be its
conclusion.
Let i  i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) and   	 be inferences, and let 1 stand for the
(meta)inferential relation between premises and conclusion of a metainferences. An imme-
diate question that pops up is the following: when is a metainference 1  1, . . . , n 
n 1   	 valid in a logic L? Here is a plausible answer:
DEFINITION 2.5. A metainference 1  1, . . . , n  n 1   	 is valid in (a
propositional logic) L if and only if, for every valuation v, if v satisfies every i  i
according to L, then v satisfies   	 according to L.
A valuation v satisfies an inference    in a specific logic if and only if v is not a
counterexample of   ’s validity in that logic.
This way to characterized the notion of metainferential validity is known as a “local
conception of metainferential validity” ([11]).4 As it stands, the definition specifies what it
takes for a particular metainference to be valid in a particular logic. Nevertheless, it can—
and will—be used to specified when a metainferential scheme is valid in a logic L. In a
nutshell, a scheme is valid in L if and only if every instance of it is valid.
TS/ST, our target logic, is a consequence relation for metainferences. To understand ex-
actly how it works, we need to introduce first two inferential but non-Tarskian consequence
relations: the non-reflexive TS and the non-transitive ST.5
2.3. ST and TS: Two substructural consequence relations. ST and TS are labelled
as substructural because at least one structural feature of a Tarskian consequence relation
3 We will not consider multi-conclusions metainferences. This is not because we think there is
something wrong with them, but because it will unnecessarily complicate the presentation of the
logics we will further introduce.
4 For more about this notion, and the difference between a local and a global notion
of metainferential validity, see [11]. A similar distinction was previously introduced by
Humberstone, in [20].
5 Those readers that are already familiar with these logics may safely skip the following subsection.
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is given up by them. ST abandons Cut, while TS drops Reflexivity. We will present propo-
sitional versions of ST and TS.
The logic ST can be portrayed as a p-logic, as devised by Frankowski in [14] as a means
to characterize logical systems where valid derivations are such that the degree of strength
of the conclusions can be smaller than that of the premises.6
DEFINITION 2.6 ([14]). A p-consequence relation over a propositional language L is a
relation  ⊆ P(FOR(L)) × P(FOR(L)) obeying the following conditions for all A ∈
FOR(L) and for all , ⊆ FOR(L):
(1)    if for some A ∈ , A ∈  (Reflexivity)
(2) If    and  ⊆ ′, then ′   (Monotonicity).
Additionally, a p-consequence relation  is substitution-invariant whenever if   ,
and σ is a substitution on FOR(L), then {σ(B) | B ∈ }  σ(A) -for some A ∈ .
DEFINITION 2.7 ([14]). A p-logic over a propositional language L is an ordered pair
(FOR(L),), where  is a substitution-invariant p-consequence relation.
In general, p-logics can be connected to p-matrices. ST can be represented as a p-matrix
logic associated to the 3-element Kleene algebra.
DEFINITION 2.8 ([15]). For L a propositional language, an L-p-matrix is a structure
〈V,D+,D−,O〉, such that 〈V,O〉 is an algebra of the same similarity type as L, with
universe V and a set of operations O, where D+,D− ⊆ V and D+ ⊆ D−.
DEFINITION 2.9. The 3-element Kleene algebra is the structure
K = 〈{1, 1
2
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Moreover, the functions  and are definable via the usual definitions.
DEFINITION 2.10 ([8]). A 3-valued ST-matrix is a p-matrix
MST = 〈{1, 12 , 0}, {1}, {1,
1
2
}, {f ¬K , f ∧K , f ∨K }〉
such that 〈{1, 12 , 0}, {f ¬K , f ∧K , f ∨K }〉 is the 3-element Kleene algebra.
Now, as is common practice, semantic structures such as p-matrices induce consequence
relations and, therefore, logics with the help of valuation functions, e.g., homomorphisms
from FOR(L) to the set of truth-values of the semantic structure in question—in this case,
the set {1, 12 , 0}. Valuations are extended from propositional variables to complex formulae
with the help of the truth-functions for the connectives; in this case the functions given by
6 For an extensive presentation of ST, see also [8], [27], [29], and [9].
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the 3-element Kleene algebra. In our particular case, we can define what a valid inference or
sequent is in any p-matrix logic—and, therefore, in ST—in the following straightforward
manner. Notice that, below, M is a substitution-invariant p-consequence relation, whence
(FOR(L),M) is a p-logic. In addition to that, when a p- matrix M induce some p-logic
L, we may interchangeably refer to M as L.
DEFINITION 2.11. For M a p-matrix, an M-valuation v satisfies a sequent or inference
   (written v M   ) if and only if if v[] ⊆ D+ (e.g., if v(γ ) ∈ D+, for every
γ ∈ ), then v(A) ∈ D−, for some A ∈ . A sequent or inference    is M-valid
(written M   ) if and only if v M   , for all M-valuations v.
But a more straightforward characterization of ST’s validity is the following one:7
ST    if and only if for every valuation v,
{
if v(B) ∈ {1} for all B ∈ 
then v(A) ∈ {1, 12 } for some A ∈ .
Another interesting generalization of Tarskian consequence relations is the notion of
q-consequence relation, due to Malinowski [23].8
DEFINITION 2.12 ([23]). A q-consequence relation over a propositional language L is
a relation  ⊆ P(FOR(L))× ⊆ P(FOR(L)) obeying the following conditions for all
A ∈ FOR(L) and for all , ⊆ FOR(L):
(1) If    and  ⊆ ′, then ′   (Monotonicity)
(2)  ∪ {A |   A}   if and only if    (Quasi-closure).
DEFINITION 2.13 ([23]). A q-logic over a propositional language L is an ordered pair
(FOR(L),), where  is a substitution-invariant q-consequence relation.
DEFINITION 2.14 ([23]). For L a propositional language, an L-q-matrix is a structure
〈V,D+,D−,O〉, such that 〈V,O〉 is an algebra of the same similarity type as L, with
universe V and a set of operations O, where D+,D− ⊆ V and D+ ∩ D− = ∅.
The 3-valued q-matrix logics associated to the 3-element Kleene algebra that will be
dealing with in our ongoing investigation is the logic TS.
7 Another way to present ST’s validity requires talking about strict and tolerant satisfaction or
truth. A valuation v satisfies tolerantly a formula A if and only if v(A) ∈ {1, 12 }, and satisfies it
strictly if and only if v(A) ∈ {1}. Then, a valuation v satisfies an inference    if and only if if
v strictly satisfies every B ∈ , then v tolerantly satisfies at least one A ∈ . Finally, an inference
from  to  is valid if and only if for every valuation v, if v satisfies strictly every B ∈ , then v
satisfies tolerantly some A ∈ . Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that this is not the only way
ST’s supporters explain their position. They prefer to talk about strict and tolerant assertion rather
than talking about strict and tolerant satisfaction, or strict and tolerant truth. As [13] explains, the
reason why they use the idea of strict and tolerant assertion instead of any of the last two (pair of)
notions, is to avoid revenge paradoxes related to the notions of “strictly true” and “strictly false”
in the context of truth-theories based on ST.
8 Wansing and Shramko offer in [32] a way to read these two kinds of logics. While a p-logic
is devised to qualify as valid derivations of conclusions whose degree of strength (understood
as the conviction in its truth) is smaller than that of the premises, the relation of q-logic is
devised to qualify as valid derivations of true sentences from nonrefuted premises (understood
as hypotheses).
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DEFINITION 2.15 ([8], [24]). A 3-valued TS-matrix is a q-matrix







such that 〈{1, 12 , 0}, {f ¬K , f ∧K , f ∨K }〉 is the 3-element Kleene algebra.
TS is discussed by e.g., Cobreros, Ripley, Egré and van Rooij in [8], and also by Chemla,
Egré, and Spector in [7] in the context of the more general discussion of what represents
a “proper” consequence relation between formulae. Moreover, it was also discussed by
Malinowski in [24] as a tool to model empirical inference with the aid of the 3-valued
Kleene algebra, and more recently was stressed by Rohan French in [16], in connection
with the paradoxes of self-reference.
Now we need to clarify how q-matrix logics validate or invalidate inferences —following,
e.g., [33, p. 196]. Notice that, below, M is a substitution-invariant q-consequence relation,
whence (FOR(L),M) is a q-logic. In addition to that, when a q-matrix M induce some
q-logic L, we may interchangeably refer to M as L.
DEFINITION 2.16. For M a q-matrix, an M-valuation v satisfies a sequent or inference
  A (written v M   A) if and only if if v[] ∩ D− = ∅, then v(A) ∈ D+.
For M a q-matrix, an inference    is M-valid (written M   ) if and only if
v M   , for all M-valuations v.
The following is a more straightforward characterization of TS’s inferential validity:
TS    if and only if for every valuation v,
{
if v(B) ∈ {1, 12 } for all B ∈ 
then v(A) ∈ {1} for some A ∈ .
From these definitions of ST and TS’s validities, the following facts follow.
FACT 2.17 ([8]). TS is a nonreflexive, and thus a substructural, logic.
FACT 2.18 ([8]). ST is a nontransitive, and thus a substructural, logic.
FACT 2.19 ([16]). TS has no valid inferences or sequents.
FACT 2.20 ([18], [27]). ST and classical propositional logic CL have the same set of
valid inferences or sequents.
In the next section we will present a notion of consequence relation for metainferences
based on both ST and TS.9 Finally, we must stress that, though we have distinguished
between consequence relations and logics, in the rest of the article we will use them
interchangeably.
§3. TS/ST, a logic for classically valid metainferences. We will now present TS/ST,
a logic that not only validates every classically valid inference—as ST does—, but also
validates every classically valid metainference (of level 1).10 This is possible because
9 [3], [11], and [26] have shown that—through some suitable translation—the set of valid
inferences in LP coincides with the set of valid meta-inferences in ST. Moreover, [16] have
conjectured that —again, through some suitable translation—the set of valid inferences in SK,
e.g., Strong Kleene logic, coincides with the set of valid meta-inferences in TS.
10 As we already have mentioned, we will present single-conclusion metainferentiallogics, TS/ST
being the first of them. Moreover, the consequence relation will be defined for inferences with a
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TS/ST’s consequence relation embraces a feature of the inferential consequence relation
ST, but applies it to the metainferential level. Just to remember, an inference is valid in
ST if and only if, for every valuation v, if the premises satisfy certain—demanding—
standard, then the conclusion meet some less demanding code. In particular, an inference
is valid in ST if and only if, if for every premise A, v(A) = 1—e.g., if v strictly satisfies
every premise—, then for some conclusion B, v(B) = 1, 12 —e.g., v tolerantly satisfies
a conclusion.11 Conversely, if v strictly satisfies every premise, but does not tolerantly
satisfies some conclusion, then v is a counterexample to the validity of that inference
in ST.
We will adopt a similar norm for TS/ST’s validity notion, but for the metainferential
level. Thus, TS/ST’s standard for the premises will be more demanding than its standard
for the conclusion.
DEFINITION 3.1. A metainference 1  1, . . . , n  n 1   	 is valid in TS/ST if
and only if, for every valuation v, if every i  i is satisfied by v according to TS, then v
satisfies   	 in ST.
Before proving our main result, it is worth noticing two facts. The first one relates ST
and the semantic consequence relation of classical propositional logic, CL. The second
one relates TS and CL. So now we should pause to clarify how—the propositional—CL
behaves.
The valuations that define CL’s consequence relation are bivalent, exclusive and exhaus-
tive: for every valuation v and every formula A, either v(A) = 1 or v(A) = 0, but not both.
An inference    is valid in CL if and only if, for every valuation v, either v(γ ) = 0 (for
some γ ∈ ), or v(δ) = 1 (for some δ ∈ ). Similarly, a valuation v is a counterexample
to    in CL if and only if for every γ ∈ , v(γ ) = 1, and for every δ ∈ , v(δ) = 0.
We would like to stress the following fact: a valuation v is a counterexample in ST to an
inference    if and only if v is a counterexample to that inference in CL. Remember
that v is a counterexample to    in either of those two logics if and only if, for every
γ ∈ , v(γ ) = 1, and for every δ ∈ , v(δ) = 0. Similarly, v satisfies an inference   
in TS if and only if v satisfies that inference in CL. Recall that v satisfies    in either
of those two logics if and only if either v(γ ) = 0, for some γ ∈ , or, for some δ ∈ ,
v(δ) = 1.
Now we can introduce the main result. It establishes that a metainference (of level 1) is
valid in CL if and only if it is valid in TS/ST.12
THEOREM 3.2. The First Collapse Result (For every metainference 1  1, . . . , n 
n 1   	) 1  1, . . . , n  n 1   	 is valid in CL if and only if 1 
1, . . . , n  n 1   	 is valid in TS/ST.
finite set of premises. Nevertheless, we hope that the results that we will introduce may be safely
extended to multi-conclusion versions of these logics, that also admit arguments with infinite
premises.
11 Here, v(B) = 1, 12 just means that v(B) ∈ {1, 12 }. For simplicity, a similar notation will be used in
the rest of the paper.
12 As both an anonymous referee and Thomas Ferguson (in private conversation) describes it, TS
is providing a strict standard on premises of metainferences, while ST is playing the role of a
tolerant criteria. We would like to thank the anonymous referee (and Thomas Ferguson) for this
observation.
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Proof. 1  1, . . . , n  n 1   	 is invalid in CL if and only if for some v and
every i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if v satisfies every i  i according to CL, then v does not satisfies
  	 in CL, if and only if, if for every i  i, v(γ ) = 0 or v(δ) = 1, for some γ ∈ i or
some δ ∈ i, then for every σ ∈  and every π ∈ 	, v(σ ) = 1 and v(π) = 0, if and only
if if v satisfies every i  i according to TS, then v does not satisfies   	 according
to ST, if and only if 1  1, . . . , n  n 1   	 is invalid in TS/ST. 
Another way to understand this result is the following: a metainference (of level 1) is
invalid in CL if and only if there is a valuation v that satisfies every premise and does not
satisfy the conclusion. But a valuation v satisfies a premise of a metainference of level 1—
e.g., an inference—according to CL if and only if, either v gives value 0 to some premise
of the inference, or gives value 1 to some conclusion. And that is precisely what it takes
for v to satisfy that premise according to TS. Moreover, a valuation v does not satisfy the
conclusion of the metainference according to CL if and only if v gives value 1 to every
premise of the inference that is the conclusion of the metainference, and value 0 to every
conclusion of the inference that is the conclusion of the metainference.13 And that is just
what it takes for v to be a counterexample to the validity of that inference in ST.
One last thing about metainferences before moving on. It is usual to consider sentences
as degenerate cases of inferences (e.g., with an empty set of premises). In a similar fashion,
inferences can be interpreted as degenerate cases of metainferences of level 1 (e.g., with
an empty set of premises). Thus, every classically valid inference will be valid in TS/ST,
and vice-versa. A degenerate case of a metainference of level 1—e.g., an inference—is
valid in TS/ST if and only if every valuation satisfies the conclusion according to the
standard for conclusions—e.g., according to ST. And ST recovers every classically valid
inference.
3.1. A classical metainferential theory of truth. A truth predicate Tr is transparent if
it satisfies the transparency condition, that states that, for every valuation v, every model
M and every sentence A, vM(A) = vM(Tr(〈A〉). It is worth noticing that TS/ST can be
safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. We will called the resulting theory,
TS/ST+.
As Kripke proves in [22], Tr can be understood as a fixed-point of a jump operator
over the SK’s scheme. But the SK’s scheme is the one used to specify how ST, TS,
and, moreover, TS/ST’s valuations work. Thus, TS/ST+’s truth predicate Tr can also be
understood as a fixed-point, proving that the theory itself is nontrivial.
Of course, the details should be handled with care. As Tr is a predicate, valuations are
no longer enough to interpret TS/ST+’s language. Models, then, should be included in the
picture.
Let L+ be the result of expanding TS/ST’s language L with a predicate Tr and an infi-
nite number of individual constants.14 L+’s interpretation will be partially constrained to
ensure that paradoxical sentences will be around.15 In particular, some individual constants
will be treated as distinguished names. Thus, we will fix a 1 − 1 function τ from names
13 Remember that even if metainferences are single-conclusion, the inference that is the conclusion
of a metainference might be multi-conclusion.
14 To keep things as simple as possible, TS/ST’s language will not include quantifiers nor variables
for names.
15 We follow here the strategy used in [28]. This way of handling self-reference is also similar to the
one used in [5].
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to formulas of L+, and require, for every distinguished name n, that n should denote τ (n)
in every model. This means that set FOR(L+) of formulas of L+ must be a subset of the
domain of every model, and that only infinite models will be admitted.16
DEFINITION 3.3. An TS/ST-model for the language L+ is a structure < D, I > such that:
• D is a domain such that FOR(L+) ⊆ D, and
• I is an interpretation function such that:
◦ For an ordinary name a, I(a) ∈ D
◦ For a distinguished name n, I(n) = τ (n)
◦ For an n-ary predicate P, I(P) ∈ {0, 12 , 1}D
n
◦ For propositional letters p, I(p) ∈ {0, 12 , 1}◦ For atomic formulas (that are not propositional letters) A = P(t1, t2, . . . , tn),
I(A) = I(P)(I(t1), I(t2), . . . , I(tn))
◦ I(¬A) = 1 − I(A)
◦ I(A ∧ B) = min(I(A), I(B))
◦ I(A ∨ B) = max(I(A), I(B))
◦ I(A  B) = max(1 − I(A), I(B)).
A TS/ST+-model is a TS/ST-model that obeys the following restriction: for every pair
of formulas A, Tr(〈A〉, I(A) = I(Tr(〈A〉). This last condition ensures the transparency
of Tr.
With these notions at hand, it is possible to prove that TS/ST+ is nontrivial—or, more
accurately, satisfiable.
THEOREM 3.4. TS/ST+ is satisfiable.
Proof. TS/ST+’s satisfiability follows from the fact that the truth predicate can be inter-
preted as a fixed-point of a jump operator over the Strong Kleene scheme, that is the ones
used by TS/ST’s—and TS/ST+—models. In fact, TS/ST’s models are just simplifications
of Ripley’s ST’s models ([28].17 And ST’s models are just the Strong Kleene logic SK’s
(or LP’s) models expanded with distinguished names, following the lines of [22].
TS/ST+-models are the subset of TS/ST-models (for L+) that satisfy transparency.
Moreover, TS/ST+’s models are only (simplified versions of) ST’s models for a first-order
language with a transparent truth predicate. And, as Ripley shows in [28], these models
are transparent not only because the truth predicate is transparent, but also because “no
amount of adding Ts [e.g., truth predicates like Tr] or removing them can make a valid
argument invalid, or vice versa” ([28], page 6). 
3.2. Why TS/ST is not fully classical. So far, we have shown that TS/ST recovers not
only every classically valid inference, but also recaptures every classically valid metainfer-
ence (of level 1). Nevertheless, TS/ST is not fully classical. Many classically valid meta-
metainferences—e.g., metainferences of level 2—are invalid in TS/ST. In particular, the
meta-metainference that we will call Meta-Cut, turns out to be invalid in TS/ST.
16 This maneuver is standard in works on theories of truth. See, for example, [21] and [28].
17 This is because L+ does not include quantifiers nor an identity predicate.
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A metainferential consequence relation not only determines a validity standard for
metainferences (and, furthermore, for inferences and sentences): it also fixes a standard
for metainferences of higher levels. In particular, if C is a propositional metainferential
consequence relation, a meta-metainference is valid in C if and only if every valuation v
that satisfies every premise according to C, satisfies the conclusion in C. Moreover, for any
metainference 1, j n  of any level n (where  and each i are metainferences of
level n − 1, and n stands for the metainferential relation of level n between premises
and conclusion), 1, j n  is valid in C if and only if, for every valuation v, if v
satisfies every premise i according to C, then v satisfies the conclusion  according
to C.
It is not hard to realize why Meta-Cut is invalid in TS/ST. Take any instance of it
that involves only propositional letters, where A is different from every other sentence in
the premises and the conclusion. The valuation v such that v(A) = 12 , v(γ ) = v(δ) =
v(σ ) = 1—for every γ ∈ ji , every δ ∈ nm and every σ ∈ lk–, and v(π) = 0—for
every π ∈ 	sr—, satisfies every premise according to TS/ST, but does not confirm the
conclusion in TS/ST.
Nevertheless, it is possible to design a new consequence relation that recovers not only
every classically valid inference—as ST and TS/ST do– and every classically valid metain-
ference –as TS/ST does—, but also every classically valid meta-metainference. The next
section will be devoted to present such logic.
§4. A consequence relation for meta-metainferences: CM2. To see how this new
consequence relation works, we will need first to introduce a new metainferential conse-
quence relation: ST/TS.
DEFINITION 4.1. A metainference 1  1, . . . , k  n 1   	 is valid in ST/TS
if and only if, for every valuation v, if v satisfies every i  i according to ST, then v
confirms   	 in TS.
Now we are in a position to define the consequence relation that recovers every clas-
sically valid inference, metainference and meta-metainference—including Meta-Cut. We
will call it CM2 (short for “consequence relation for metainferences of level 2”).
DEFINITION 4.2. A meta-metainference 1, . . . , n 2  is valid in CM2 if and only if,
for every valuation v, if every i is satisfied by v according to ST/TS, then v confirms 
according to TS/ST.
As we have already anticipated, the main result about CM2—or STTS/TSST, if one
prefers a more informative name—says that a meta-metainference (or metainference of
level 2) is valid in CL if and only if it is valid in CM2.
THEOREM 4.3. The Second Collapse Result.
For every meta-metainference 1, . . . , n 2 , 1, . . . , n 2  is valid in CL if and
only if it is valid in CM2.
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Proof. For every valuation v, v is a counterexample to 1, . . . , n 2  in CL if
and only if it is a counterexample in CM2. A valuation is a counterexample in CL to
the validity of a meta-metainference if and only if it satisfies every premise and does not
satisfy the conclusion. But for every valuation v, v satisfies a metainference in CL if and
only if v satisfies the metainference in ST/TS. And, moreover, v is a counterexample to
a metainference in CL if and only if v satisfies it in TS/ST. Thus, the counterexamples
for meta-metainferences in CL are exactly the same as the ones in CM2. Therefore, a
meta-metainference is valid in CL if and only if it is valid in CM2. 
CM2 can also be expanded with a transparent truth predicate. The resulting theory is
called CM2+, and is satisfiable.
THEOREM 4.4. CM2+ is satisfiable.
Proof. CM2+’s language is L+, e.g., TS/ST+’s language. Moreover, CM2’s models are
the same as TS/ST’s models, and the same relation exist between CM2+’s and TS/ST+’s
models. Thus, the proof that CM2+ is satisfiable is the same as the one for TS/ST+. 
4.1. More problems. CM2’s recovers not only every classically valid meta-
metainference, but also every classically valid metainference, inference and sentence. But
metainferential consequence relations of level n not only determine a set of valid metain-
ferences of level n, but a set of valid metainferences of level higher than n. In the case
of CM2, for any metainference  n A of any level n higher than 2,  n A is valid in
CM2 if and only if, for every valuation v, if v confirms every premise γ ∈  according to
CM2, the v satisfies A in CM2. Thus, though CM2 recovers more classically valid meta-
metainferences than CM, it is not fully classical either. Many classically valid meta-meta-
metainferences—or metainferences of level 3—are invalid in CM2. In particular, what what
we will call Meta-Meta-Cut—a classically valid meta-meta-metainference—turns out to
be not valid. At this point, it might be useful to remind us the structure of Meta-Cut.
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Meta-Meta-Cut is a metainferential scheme of level 3 that has, as a conclusion, a
metainference of level 2, that has, as a conclusion, Meta-Cut’s conclusion. The premises of
this conclusion are a finite set of metainferences. Each premise has the following structure
(for 1 ≤ jω, 1 ≤ kω):
k1  
k







Meta-Meta-Cut has two premises. The conclusion of each premise will be, on one
hand, the first premise of Meta-Cut, and, on the other hand, the second Meta-Cut’s
premise. Meta-Meta-Cut’s premises have the same set of premises as the premises of
Meta-Meta-Cut’s conclusion.
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Meta-Meta-Cut is an invalid CM2 meta-meta-metainference. The valuation v such that
v(A) = 12 , v(γ ) = v(δ) = v(σ ) = 1—for every γ ∈ ji , every δ ∈ δnm and every σ ∈ lk—,
v(π) = 0—for every π ∈ 	sr—, and v(θ) = v(ξ) = v(φ) = v(φ) = 1—for every θ ∈ ed,
every ξ ∈ ed, every φ ∈ e, and every ψ ∈ e—satisfies every premise, but does not
confirms its conclusion, both things according to CM2.
Now, it can be shown (though we will not try it here) that CM2 cannot recover every
classically valid metainference of a level higher than 4. Nevertheless, it is possible to design
a hierarchy of metainferential consequence relations n—one for each n (1 ≤ n < ω)—such
that for every consequence relation for metainferences of level n, that consequence relation
recovers every classically valid metainferences of level n or less. Thus, for any classically
valid metainference of some level j, there is a consequence relation characterized by sub-
structural means that recovers it. The next section will devoted to present in detail the
construction of this hierarchy.
§5. A general result. Before presenting in detail the hierarchy, we would like to
emphasize what we are going to show:
FACT 5.1. General Result: For any level n, there is a consequence relation CMn for
metainferences of level n, such that every metainference of level n 1, . . . , k n ,
1, . . . , k n  is valid in CL if and only if 1, . . . , k n  is valid in CMn.
To prove this general result, we must first define an operation ∗ on consequence relations.
DEFINITION 5.2. For any metainferential consequence relation Lj/Lk, (Lj/Lk)∗=Lk/Lj.
When applied to a metainferential consequence relation, the star operation ∗ gives an-
other consequence relation. This new consequence relation switches the original conse-
quence relation’s standards for premises and conclusion of a sound argument (e.g., a metain-
ference).
With the help of the star operation ∗, it is now possible to define the desired hierarchy of
metainferential consequence relations.
DEFINITION 5.3. The first step of the hierarchy is, by this time, well understood. They are
the following:
CM1=TS/ST.
And for every n such that 2 ≤ n < ω, CMn is the following consequence relation:
Let 1, . . . , k and  be metainferences of level n − 1. A metainference of level n
1, . . . , k n  is valid in CMn if and only if, for every valuation v, if every 1, . . . , k
is satisfied by v according to (CMn−1)∗, then v satisfies  according to CMn−1.
Thus, for every consequence relation CMn, the following will be true:
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FACT 5.4. Third Collapse Result.
For every level n (1 ≤ n < ω), a metainference of level n 1, . . . , k n  is valid in
CL if and only if it is valid in CMn.
Proof. We will, in fact, a prove a more general claim. For every valuation v, v is a
counterexample to 1, . . . , k n  in CL if and only if it is a counterexample in CMn,
and v satisfies 1, . . . , k n  in CL if and only if v satisfies 1, . . . , k n  in (CMn)∗.
The proof is an induction on the levels of metainferences.
Base cases. We have already proven the theorem for CM1 and (CM1)∗—e.g., TS/ST
and ST/TS.
Inductive case. We will need to prove the theorem for CMn and CM∗n, for any n > 1.
By inductive hypothesis, for every valuation v, v satisfies a metainference of level n − 1
(n − 2) in CL if and only if v satisfies it in (CMn−1)∗, and v is a counterexample to a
metainference of level n − 1 (n − 2) in CL if and only if v disconfirms it in CMn−1.
Now, a valuation v satisfies a metainference of level n 1, . . . , k n  in CL, if and
only if v does not satisfy a premise or if it satisfies the conclusion—both according to
CL—, if and only if there is a i such that v does not satisfy i or v satisfy in CL, if and
only if (by inductive hypothesis) there is a i such that v does not satisfy i in CMn−1 or v
satisfies  in (CMn−1)∗, if and only if v satisfies 1, . . . , k n  in (CMn)∗.
Moreover, a valuation v is a counterexample to a metainference of level n 1, . . . , k n
 in CL if and only if v satisfies every premise and does not confirms its conclusion—both
according to CL—, if and only if every i is such that v satisfies i and v does not confirm
 in CL, if and only if (by inductive hypothesis) every i is such that v satisfies i in
(CMn−1)∗ and v does not confirms  in (CMn−1), if and only if v is a counterexample to
1, . . . , k n  in CMn. 
Before moving on, we would like to stress a general fact, that explains why each step in
the hierarchy of logics CMn recovers increasingly more metainferences. We have already
mentioned that what it takes for a valuation to be a counterexample in ST to an inference
   is exactly what it takes for it to be counterexample to that inference in CL, and
that what it takes for it to satisfy an inference    in TS is exactly what it takes for it
to satisfy that inference in CL. Similarly, for any level n, what it takes for a valuation to
be a counterexample in CMn to a metainference of level n is exactly what it takes for it to
be counterexample to that inference in CL. And, moreover, for any level n, what it takes
for a valuation to be counterexample to an inference in CL, and that what it takes for a
valuation to satisfy a metainference of level n in * is exactly what it takes for it to satisfy
that inference in CL.
5.1. Still more problems. Nevertheless, none of the consequences relations CMn is
fully classical. In fact, every CMn invalidates a version of Meta-Cut of level n − 1.
THEOREM 5.5. For every n (1 ≤ n < ω), CMn invalidates Meta-Cutn.
Proof. The proof is inductive. We have already present the structure of both Meta-Cut
and Meta-Meta-Cut, and show that Meta-Cut is invalid in CMi—e.g., TS/ST. Furthermore,
it is possible to specify the structure of each Meta-Cut of level j (2 ≤ j < ω) constructively.
Each Meta-Cutj—e.g., Meta-Cut of level j—is a two-premise metainference of level j + 1.
Each premise is a metainference of level j that has, as its conclusion, one of the premises
of an instance of Meta-Cut of level j − 1. The conclusion of Meta-Cut of level j is also
a metainference of level j that has, as a conclusion, the conclusion of an instance of
A FULLY CLASSICAL TRUTH THEORY 15
Meta-Cut of level j − 1. But the two premises and the conclusion of the particular version
of Meta-Cutj that we will be talking about, has the same (and single) premise. For the sake
of simplicity, it will be a metainference of level j − 1 such that every propositional letter
in it does not appear in the instance of the metainference Meta-Cutj−1 used to design this
instance of Meta-Cutj. Moreover, every inference that occurs in it will be an instance of
p  q. Here, p and q are propositional letters that appear only once in the metainference.
Thus, the metainference that is the premise of both premises, and also the premise of the
conclusion of Meta-Cutj, can be considered a contingent metainference, in the sense that
some valuations will satisfy it, and some others will not.
Now we can present a counterexample to Meta-Cutj. It will be a valuation j such that,
for every p, q in the premise of both premises of Meta-Cutj—e.g., two metainferences
of level j—, and also in the premise of the conclusion, v(p) = v(q) = 1. The rest
of the formulas—e.g., the conclusion of each premise, and also the conclusion of the
conclusion—will be part of Meta-Cutj−1. By inductive hypothesis, there is a valuation
v∗ that is a counterexample to Meta-Cutj−1. For all those formula B in Meta-Cutj−1—
e.g., the conclusion of each premise, and also the conclusion of the conclusion—, let
v(B) = v ∗ (B). In particular, let the meta-cut-formula A be such that v(A) = v ∗ (A) = 12 .
The valuation v satisfies every premise and does not confirm the conclusion of Meta-Cutj
in CMj . Remember that Meta-Cutj is a metainference of level j + 1. A valuation v does
not satisfy an instance of Meta-Cutj in CMj if and only if it satisfies every premise and
does not satisfy the conclusion, both according to CMj . The conclusion and each premise
are metainferences of level j. Thus, v satisfies any of them in CMj if and if either if v
does not satisfy some premise according to CM∗j-1, or it confirms the conclusion according
to CMj−1. As v(B) = v ∗ (B), for every B in Meta-Cutj−1, and v∗ is a counterexam-
ple to it, then v∗—and thus v—satisfies every Meta-Cutj−1’s premise according to CM∗j .
Therefore, it satisfies the conclusion of every premise of Meta-Cutj, because it satisfies
each conclusion.18 Moreover, v does not satisfy Meta-Cutj’s conclusion. Remember that
for every p, q in the premise of the conclusion, v(p) = v(q) = 1. Then, the premise of
the conclusion is satisfied by v according to CM∗j . As v(B) = v ∗ (B), for every B in
Meta-Cutj−1, and v∗ is a counterexample to it, then v will not satisfy Meta-Cutj−1’s either.
But Meta-Cutj−1’s conclusion is the conclusion of the conclusion of Meta-Cutj. Then, v
will satisfy each premise of Meta-Cutj, but will not confirm its conclusion. Therefore, v is
a counterexample to it. 
Thus, though no logic in the hierarchy recovers every classically valid metainference,
each metainference is recaptured by some logic CMn. Nevertheless, no logic CMn recap-
tures every classically valid metainference. In the next section we will present a logic with
this desired feature. To define it, we will use the hierarchy that we have presented.
§6. A fully classical logic characterized by substructural means. The goal of this
section is to define a consequence relation that recovers every classically valid metainfer-
ence. We will call it CMω , and it could be understood as “the union of every CMn”.
DEFINITION 6.1. A meta-inference of level n—for any level n—1, . . . , k n  is valid
in CMω , if and only if 1, . . . , k n  is valid in some CMj (1 ≤ j < ω).
18 For every metainference of every level j, the set of counterexamples to it in CM∗j is included in
the set of counterexamples to it in CMj , as it is not hard to see. We leave the proof as an exercise
to the reader.
16 FEDERICO MATÍAS PAILOS
FACT 6.2. The General Recovery Result.
For every level n (1 ≤ n < ω), a metainference of level n 1, . . . , k n  is valid in
CL if and only if it is valid in CMω .
Proof. We know, by the Third Collapse Result, that for every level n (1 ≤ n < ω), a
metainference of level n 1, . . . , k n  is valid in CL if and only if it is valid in CMn.
But if it is valid in CMn, then, by the definition of CMω , it is valid in CMω . Therefore,
every classically valid metainference of any level n will be valid in CMω . 
What is, then, the exact relationship between CL and CMω? Dave Ripley (in [28], [29])
maintains that ST is just classical logic. His point is that ST recovers every classically valid
inference. Others, like [4] and [11], argue against Ripley’s claim. They claim that there are
some central features of CL that ST cannot recover. Those features are some classically
valid metainferences, mainly of level 1. But ST loses classically valid metainferences in
every level. CM—e.g., TS/ST—recovers every classically valid metainferences, but still
loses some classically valid meta-metainferences, like Meta-Cut. CM2 recovers them, but
still cannot recover every classically valid meta-meta-metainference. Moreover, for every
n, though CMn recovers every classically valid metainference of level n, it cannot recover
every classically valid metainference of higher levels. In this regard, CMω works better
than every CMn. CMω recovers every classically valid metainference of every level. If
a classical logic is defined through the inferences and metainferences of every level that
turns out valid in it, then CMω is a fully classical logic. The only special thing about it is
that it is defined through substructural means.
One more attractive feature of CMω is that not only it is a fully classical logic, but it
also supports a transparent truth predicate. We will call the theory obtained from CMω by
expanding the language with a transparent truth predicate Tr, CMω+. The following is an
important result about this theory:
THEOREM 6.3. CMω+ is satisfiable.
Proof. CMω+’s satisfiability proof runs just as the corresponding proof for TS/ST+.
Notice that the language and the models of both theories are exactly the same. 
Therefore, CMω+ is the truth theory we were looking for. It not only validates every
classically valid metainference of any level, but also supports a transparent truth predicate.
§7. Objections and replies. Before ending, we would like to address two objections
that have been raised to us by an anonymous referee. The first one is the following. She
has suggested that TS/ST does not actually recovers Cut, because what we have called Cut
does not give the correct metainferential rendering of the unrestricted Cut rule. As far as
we know, the discussion around Cut as always been focuses in rule-versions (additive or
multiplicative, or even mixed-forms) of the metainferential schema that we have called Cut.
This is exactly how Cut is presented, for example, in [28] and [29]. Surely, the different
metainferential schemes that are instances of what we have called Meta − Cutn are related
to Cut in some way. Nevertheless, we are not inclined to claim that they are, as the referee
suggest, the same rule—or instances of a possible unrestricted Cut rule. Each rule -or, more
precisely, each instance of Meta − Cutn- has its own unique level. We can’t tell how we
are meant to identify rules (e.g., metainferences) across levels. In any case, this is not an
easy task. But until that issue is settled, we cannot justifiably claim that there is such an
“unrestricted Cut rule”. In any case, if, as the referee claims, Meta-Cut (e.g., Meta − Cut1)
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is the rule that truly express the unrestricted Cut rule, then, as CM2 validates it, CM2
truly recovers Cut. Nevertheless, certainly the referee will claim that the metainference
that really expresses Cut (or, as she claims, gives the correct metainferential rendering of
the unrestricted Cut rule) in CM2 is Meta − Cut2. And, more generally, as no logic CMn
validates Meta − Cutn, then no logic in the hierarchy really recovers Cut. But notice that
none of these objections can be raised against CMω . As CMω validates any metainference
that is valid in at least one of the logics CMn in the hierarchy, then, as every metainferential
version of Cut is recovered at some point in the hierarchy, CMω itself validates every single
one of them. Moreover, as it was proved, CMω can be safely expanded with a transparent
truth predicate. The resulting theory, CMω+, is satisfiable. But this result has nothing to do
with the nontransitivite of CMω+. In fact, CMω+ is as transitive as CMω , because both
of them validate every metainferential version of Cut, including (what we have called) Cut
itself. The main reason that explains CMω+’s satisfiability is that it is defined through SK-
models, and its logical constants are the usual ones. In particular, no constant like a strong
negation (e.g., a strong negation, in this context, might be understood as a unary constant
∼ such that for every formula A and valuation v, v(∼ A) = 0 if and only if v(A) = 1, and
in any other case, v(∼ A) = 1).19 Every paradoxical sentence that can be expressed with
the vocabulary of the theory, like the Liar or any Curry-sentence, might (or will) receive
the value 12 in every valuation.
The second objection points directly to CMω . It claims that it is not correct to say that
CMω is fully classical just because it not only recovers every classical inference, but also
every metainference of any level. If CMω were a real fully classical logic, then it would
behave just like any presentation of classical logic. For example, it would not be satisfiable
when a transparent truth predicate is added to it. But, as any standard presentation of
classical logic, such as a Hilbert-style axiomatic calculus for classical logic, cannot be
expanded with a transparent truth predicate, this shows that classical logic and CMω are
two different things.
This point is contentious, for at least three reasons. The first one is the following. Some
authors, such as Ripley and his co-authors in [28], defend that different presentations of
the same logics may behave differently with respect to the same language. Then, it is
perfectly possible that, for example, a two-valued presentation of classical logic—e.g.,
CL—cannot be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate, while that kind of
predicate can be added to a three-valued presentation of it—e.g., ST—without the resulting
theory becoming trivial. We do not endorse this position. Nevertheless, we do think that
it is an open debate whether or not a logic is sensible to its different presentation—e.g.,
in a sequent calculus, in a natural deduction system, in an axiomatic one, in a two-valued
semantics, in a three-valued semantics, etc.
The second reason is that in order to establish whether or not two logic are in fact the
same, a criteria to distinguish between logics is required. Here, we have implicitly assume
an extensional criteria. This norm proposes the following: for any two logics L1 and L2, L1
is the same logic as L2 if and only if the validates exactly the same sentences, inferences
and metainferences of level n, for any level n. If this is the right way to distinguish between
logics, then it is correct to claim that CL and CMω are the same logic. But there are other
criteria that have been proposed. For example, Dicher and Paoli, in [12], claim that a logic
is a similarity class of abstract consequence relations. And according to that criteria, for
example, ST and CL are two different logics—in fact, ST is just LP. If Dicher and Paoli’s
19 For more about strong or classical negations, see [10].
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criteria is the right one, then every logic in the hierarchy is also equivalent to LP. We are
not sure whether or not CMω and CL belong the the same similarity class of abstract
consequence relation. In any case, whether or not Dicher and Paoli’s criteria is the right
way to distinguish between logics, or whether the extensional criteria is the right one, or
if none of them get things right, is a complex issue. Thus, what we want to defend is the
following, weaker version of our original claim. If the extensional criteria is the right way
to distinguish logics, then it is certainly true that CL and CMω are the same logic—and it
would be right to claim that CMω is fully classical. But if the antecedent of this conditional
is false, then CL and CMω may be different logics. We think that Dicher and Paoli’s is not
a good way to identify logics for many reasons. Just to mention one: according to them,
there cannot be substructural logics, because every abstract consequence relation needs
to be reflexive, monotone and transitive. Thus, if one thinks that substructural logics are
logics, then one needs to reject Dicher and Paoli’s criteria.
Finally, even if it is true that CMω is not equivalent to CL, it still can be true that
CMω is fully classical. The point, here, is what characterized a logic as classical. If this
means to be equivalent to CL, then CMω might not be classical—at least, for example,
if two logics cannot be equivalent if they behave differently when they are expanded with
the say vocabulary. But if what defines a logic as classical is to validate the same set of
metainferences (of every level) as CL, then CMω is certainly classical—even if it turns
out to be not equivalent to CL.
§8. Conclusion. We have present a three-valued consequence relation for metainfer-
ences, called TS/ST, or (latter) CM, defined with the help of the substructural logics ST
and TS. Even though every classically valid inference is valid in ST, some metainferences—
most importantly, Cut—are lost. CM not only recovers every classically valid inference,
but also every classically valid metainference. Moreover, it is possible to expand CM with
a transparent truth predicate. Thus, it seems to work better than a truth theory based on
ST, in the sense that—in Hjortland’s words—it “mutilates” less classical logic in the
process. Nevertheless, CM is not entirely classical either. Some classically valid meta-
metainferences—most importantly, Meta-Cut—are lost. But the meta-metainferential
consequence relation that we have called CM2 can recapture every classically valid metain-
ference. Despite everything it recovers, CM2 still cannot recapture every classically valid
meta-meta-metainference. Nevertheless, the consequence relation CM3 can recover every
classically valid metainference. In fact, these three logics are the initial steps of an infi-
nite hierarchy of logics, the CMn logics. Each CMn specifies a consequence relation for
metainferences of level n, that recovers every classically valid metainference of level n
or less, but still cannot recapture every classically valid metainferences of higher levels.
Nevertheless, the logic CMω do recover every classically valid metainference. Therefore,
CMω is a fully classical logic, in the sense that every classically valid inference or metain-
ference of any level is valid according to it. Moreover, CMω can also be safely expanded
with a transparent truth predicate. Thus, it seems like a very attractive truth theory.
Nevertheless, there still is plenty work to do in relation to these logics and truth theories.
For example, it seems not easy to imagine a proof theory for them. One option, somewhat
in the line of the sequent calculi developed in [25], is to present a meta-sequent calculi
for TS/ST+.20 Paradoxes might be avoided by given up Meta-Cut. Presumably, if that
20 We are aware that Rohan French is currently working on a similar sequent calculi for
metainferences, but for nonreflexive theories.
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approach works, it can be adopted for theories based on logics and truth theories that are
higher in the hierarchy. Nevertheless, that cannot be what a sequent calculi for CMω with
a transparent truth predicate might look like. Notice that that proof theory should make
valid every classically valid metainference (e.g., metarule) of any level, while avoiding
paradoxes. We leave the exploration of these routes for future work.
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